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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROVISIONS OF THE PATRIOT
ACT: SHOULD THEY BE ALLOWED TO SUNSET?

I. INTRODUCTION
What is the importance of tracking and preventing the financing of
terrorism? The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, commonly referred to as the 9-11 Commission, addressed this question
directly in the report it produced at the end of its investigation into the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001 (“9-11”).1 Specifically, the 9-11 Commission
recommended that “[v]igorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain
front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.”2 The Commission explained
that the primary value of tracking terrorist financing was not necessarily the
deprivation of funds available to the terrorists, but rather the information that
could be obtained through investigations of the terrorists’ financial networks.3
Often, tracking financial networks may prove more effective than traditional
operational law enforcement at shutting down terrorist networks preemptively,
particularly when there is an ongoing or long-term investigation.4 However,
this recommendation of the 9-11 Commission Report could be considered
preaching to the choir, considering that most of the post 9-11 legislation
regarding terrorist financing has been designed with this purpose in mind.5 It
has been argued that even with the exhaustive anti-money laundering controls
in effect today, the series of transactions that facilitated 9-11 likely would not
have been noticed in time to prevent it.6 Considering the relatively small

1. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9-11
COMMISSION REPORT, 381–82 [hereinafter 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT].
2. Id. at 382.
3. Id.
4. Diplomacy in the Age of Terrorism: What is the State Department’s Strategy?: Hearing
Before Comm. on International Relations H.R., 108th Cong. 67 (2004) (statement of Earl
Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S.
Department of State).
5. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302(b),
115 Stat. 272, 297 (2001) (defining the purposes of Title III of the Patriot Act).
6. Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering,
and the War on Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 974 (2003). There is some support for this
proposition in the 9-11 Commission Report. The Report notes that the terrorists often secured
funding through small transactions that were largely unremarkable. 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT,
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transactions that were carried out and the total number of similar transactions
that occur around the world in a day, attempting to identify well-disguised
transactions benefiting terrorism would appear to be similar to looking for a
needle in a very large haystack.7 The primary anti-money laundering
legislation enacted after 9-11 was Title III of the Patriot Act, titled the
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti Terrorist Financing Act
of 2001.8 Although Title III has been criticized as ineffective in preventing
day to day transactions that finance terrorism, this Comment concludes that the
Act must be judged not on its short term success, but rather on its long term
potential in conjunction with traditional law enforcement and global measures.
Accordingly, anti-money laundering legislation must be examined with respect
to facilitating ongoing and extensive investigations rather than as a tool to
prevent individual acts of terrorism. Further, the anti-money laundering
provisions of the Patriot Act should be evaluated in light of their ability to
disrupt the terrorists’ overall financing system. This is largely what Title III of
the Patriot Act is poised to do.9 The Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001 (the “Patriot Act”) was made into law on
October 26, 2001, shortly over a month after the attacks on September 11,
2001.10 Despite coming under heavy fire, the Patriot Act remains intact today,
and, in conjunction with previously enacted legislation, is the primary tool that
law enforcement officials use to combat terrorist financing and other money
laundering crimes. The Act is scheduled to sunset in 2005 unless Congress
acts and this comment concludes that Title III should be renewed.11
No discussion of terrorist financing would be complete without addressing
the issue of money laundering. Money laundering is “an indispensable
element of organized criminal activities.”12 It is “the process by which one
conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and
disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.”13 Experts sometimes refer
supra note 1, at 224. The Report also notes that “no financial institution filed a Suspicious
Activity Report (SAR) . . . with respect to any transaction of any of 19 hijackers before 9/11.” Id.
at 528 n.116. However, the fact that the Report emphasizes the importance of addressing terrorist
financing indicates that the government realized the legislation should not necessarily target only
individual acts of terrorism, but rather the comprehensive financing networks.
7. See The 9-11 Commission and Efforts to Identify and Combat Terrorist Financing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 2–3 (2004)
[hereinafter The 9-11 Commission] (statement of John E. Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director,
Counterterrorism Division, Fed. Bureau of Investigation).
8. USA Patriot Act § 302(b).
9. See id. (defining the purposes of Title III of the Patriot Act).
10. Id.
11. Id. §224.
12. Christopher Boran, Money Laundering, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 847, 848 (2003).
13. Id. at 847.
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to the money laundering process involved in financing terrorism as “reverse
money laundering,” because the money sought to be laundered is often
obtained from legitimate sources and then funneled to illegal purposes.14
However, the process is substantially similar to traditional money laundering,
where the source is illegal but the use legitimate.15
Since 9-11, money laundering has received substantially more attention,
which is due in large part to leads that may prove that the attacks were partially
funded by laundered money.16 Prior to 9-11, money laundering legislation was
primarily backward looking.17 The authorities were interested in using money
laundering legislation to prosecute crimes that had already occurred.18
Prosecutors could charge criminals with violations of anti-money laundering
laws that may be easier to prove than the substantive underlying crime, or they
could simply tack on money laundering crimes to other charges in order to
extend the defendant’s sentence.19 The harm was already done and, at worst,
the criminals could reinvest the money in criminal activities. However, in the
context of terrorism, failure to prevent money laundering results in more
severe consequences.20 Terrorists may use the money to plan for an attack, or
to obtain the materials and supplies needed to carry out an attack.21 In the case
of terrorism, money laundering is a predicate offense, and it becomes more
important to stop the process before it is completed.22 This makes it important
to establish legislation that is forward looking.23
Part II of this Comment will explain the process of money laundering,
focusing in particular on the three stages of the process, followed by a history
of anti-money laundering legislation in the U.S. up to and including the
enactment of the Patriot Act. The Comment will focus on the provisions of the
14. See Stefan D. Cassella, International Money Laundering: From Latin America to Asia,
Who Pays?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 116, 121 (2004); W. Clifton Holmes, Strengthening
Available Evidence-Gathering Tools in the Fight Against Transnational Money Laundering, 24
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 199 (2003).
15. Robert E. Sims, Money Laundering and Corruption: Enforcement After September 11th,
2002 A.B.A. SEC. INT’L L. & PRAC. (Mar. 21–22, 2002) (page unavailable).
16. Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money Laundering: A
Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral Policy
Reforms, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 263, 266 (2003).
17. Cassella, supra note 14, at 121.
18. Id.
19. See generally Teresa E. Adams, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges to White Collar
Crimes: What Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531,
532–34 (2000) (discussing the practice of tacking on money laundering charges to other crimes).
20. Cassella, supra note 14, at 121.
21. See id. (noting that terrorists will use such funds to perpetrate deadly attacks).
22. See id. (noting that “the idea is not to hide dirty money to make it clean, but to hide clean
money until it can be used to do something evil”).
23. See id. (explaining that there is no specific law that criminalizes reverse money
laundering).
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Patriot Act that have a substantial impact on U.S. citizens, as these have been
criticized most heavily. It will also include a brief discussion of international
anti-money laundering actions to the extent that they impact the domestic
provisions of Title III of the Patriot Act. This discussion will necessarily
include the criticisms that have been leveled at the existing legislation. Part III
will detail the advantages of the paper trail created by the provisions of the
Patriot Act, addressing several of the primary criticisms that have been leveled
against it.
II. MONEY LAUNDERING AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION
A.

The Crime of Money Laundering

The process of money laundering can be divided into three stages, the first
of which is placement.24 The placement stage consists of placing the cash into
the financial system.25 The second stage is layering.26 This stage involves
conducting a number of transactions to conceal the source of the money when
it is derived from criminal activity or the existence of the money when it is
intended for the financing of illegal activity.27 The final stage is integration.28
This involves entering the funds into commerce either for legitimate or
illegitimate means.29 Some experts have criticized dividing the process of
money laundering into three distinct stages as it is sometimes unclear where
one stage begins and the other ends.30 Also, concentrating on an old model
might prevent legislators from thinking creatively about how to attack money
laundering issues.31 However, both academics and the law enforcement
community continue to refer to the different stages when discussing the issue.32
1.

Placement

The placement stage involves introducing the money into the financial
system in a way that it can then be maneuvered through a series of complex
transactions so as to conceal the source of the money. The money launderer
faces the most risk at this point because “there exists a direct connection

24.
(2001).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

SANDEEP SAVLA, MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 10
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
SAVLA, supra note 24, at 11.
See id. at 10–11.
See id. at 11.
Id.
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between the profits and the crime.”33 Also, introducing large amounts of cash
into the financial system is likely to attract attention from law enforcement
officials.34 As a result, most anti-money laundering legislation is aimed at this
stage of the process.35 However, the three-stage model has been criticized for
placing too much emphasis on the placement stage.36 In the case of terrorism,
the money in question is often deposited before, rather than after, the criminal
act.37 In this case, the placement stage would not occur.38 This might occur
when a wealthy donor seeks to launder funds that are already in the financial
system, or when the funds are collected in the name of a charity and remain
legitimate until they are funneled to terrorist activities.39 In these cases, the
placement stage occurs when the money is ostensibly legitimate, and
legislation aimed at the placement phase is less effective.
The placement of funds into the financial system has become increasingly
difficult to detect due to the large number of ways in which to accomplish it.40
Depositing the funds into a traditional depositary institution is only one of the
ways to accomplish the placement stage.41 Obviously, this would be the most
risky considering the extensive regulation of financial institutions and the
comprehensive records retained.42 As a result, money launderers have become
adept at sidestepping the financial system.43 In order to avoid the deposit of
large sums of money that may facilitate detection, they use a process called
“smurfing.”44 The process of smurfing involves a number of people making
small deposits in a number of different depositary institutions so as to avoid
detection.45 Initially, the “smurfs” made deposits only slightly under the
amount that would trigger a report.46 However, banks began to recognize these

33. PETER LILLEY, DIRTY DEALING: THE UNTOLD TRUTH ABOUT GLOBAL MONEY
LAUNDERING, INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM 51–52 (2nd ed. 2003).
34. Sims, supra note 15 (page unavailable).
35. LILLEY, supra note 33, at 52.
36. SAVLA, supra note 24, at 10–11.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 11.
39. Cassella, supra note 14, at 121; see Alicia L. Rause, USA Patriot Act: Anti-Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Legislation in the U.S. and Europe Since September 11th, 11
U. MIAMI INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 173, 184 (2003) (explaining that terrorist groups often obtain
their financing from “legal” businesses and charities).
40. Madelyn J. Daley, Effectiveness of United States and International Efforts to Combat
International Money Laundering, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 175, 179
(2000).
41. Id. at 177–78.
42. Id. at 177.
43. Id. at 178–79.
44. LILLEY, supra note 33, at 52.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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as suspicious and report them accordingly.47 As a result, the amounts have
dipped even further, and hence become more difficult to detect.48 Although
many financial institutions are required to maintain anti-money laundering
compliance programs that target these operations, with the help of new
technology and professionals such as attorneys and accountants, there is an
ever increasing number of ways in which to accomplish the placement stage.49
The developing process of “smurfing” demonstrates the difficulty of
eradicating money laundering. In the U.S., the Constitution requires that the
law must be known to the people before they can be held accountable for
violating it.50 However, knowing the law is knowing how to avoid the law.
Money launderers, including those seeking to finance terrorism, can avoid
many of the events that would trigger a financial institution’s reporting
requirements with sufficient planning and preparation. Often they will seek
the assistance of attorneys, accountants, or other professionals who are familiar
with the law and can instruct them on how to avoid detection.51 As money
launderers break up their deposits into smaller increments, and spread them
among increasingly varying financial institutions, these institutions are
required to report an ever increasing number of transactions.52 While this
process may result in increased exposure for the “smurfers,” it also creates
more work for regulatory bodies due to the increased number of reports to
analyze.53 Also, as money laundering networks become more dependent on
“smurfs,” they create wider barriers between the low level operatives making
the deposits and the “kingpins” responsible for the underlying crimes, in order
to compensate for the increased risk of the operatives being detected and
caught.54
Another option is to avoid the financial institutions altogether. Money
launderers have come up with a number of ways to conceal the source of the
money before it is ever entered into the financial system. These include
purchasing expensive property and reselling it, and creating legitimate or semilegitimate businesses that typically deal primarily in cash in order to obscure
the source of the money.55 Businesses that are susceptible to criminal
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Daley, supra note 40, at 178–79.
50. U.S. v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 678 (1st Cir. 1985).
51. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
52. See id.
53. Peter A. Gallo, SR-IX: Using the Wrong Tool in the Wrong Place, THE J. OF TURKISH
WKLY. (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=3427.
54. See id. (noting that reporting requirements have “not been spectacularly successful in
bringing down the heads of the trafficking syndicates”). Obviously law enforcement officials are
more interested in catching those responsible for the underlying criminal activity, rather than low
level operatives whose only act may be depositing the money into the financial system.
55. See, e.g., BOB BLUNDEN, THE MONEY LAUNDERERS 20 (2001).
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2.
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that

Layering

The second step in the money laundering process, layering, involves
moving the money in a way that makes it untraceable, while still retaining
control over the money itself.57 The layering process can be accomplished in a
number of ways, most of them involving a large number of transactions that
make it increasingly difficult to trace the money to its original source.58 In
fact, one commentator has argued that the term “layering” is misleading,
because it indicates that the true ownership of the money can be revealed
simply by peeling back the layers.59 He has claimed that in reality, the process
could more accurately be termed “kaleidoscopic in nature,” a multitude of
parallel, rather than progressive transactions.60 The crime of money laundering
becomes considerably more difficult to detect at the layering stage.61 Often at
this stage the money has been divided into smaller amounts, and perhaps even
mixed in with legitimate funds.62 Also, due to the developments in technology
and globalization, money is becoming easier to move not only between
different accounts and financial institutions, but between different nations.63
However, there are a number of traits that might indicate money laundering
activities. Among these are (1) seemingly nonsensical financial transactions,
(2) large numbers of sales and purchases of investments subject to
commissions, (3) numerous accounts, seemingly unconnected, being
consolidated into a smaller number of accounts, and (4) “lack of concern over
losses on investments, bank charges or professional advisor charges.”64
Money launderers are generally not concerned with losses or charges, as their
primary concern is eliminating the paper trail.

56. Non-profit organizations are often used by terrorist organizations, leading the Financial
Action Task Force on Money Laundering to specifically include increased scrutiny for these
organizations in their Eight Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. See Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering: Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Oct. 31, 2001),
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/SRecTF_en/pdf.
57. SAVLA, supra note 24, at 13.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Hence the term sometimes given to the layering stage is “commingling.” LILLEY, supra
note 33, at 53.
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 53.
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One of the primary tools of money launderers during the layering stage is
the use of off-shore banks with stringent bank secrecy laws.65 The banks in
these jurisdictions often have very lax reporting requirements, and are
susceptible to abuse by criminal activity, whether intentional or not.66 The
U.S. has made progress in the period of time since 9-11 in facilitating
information-sharing with many of these countries.67 However, much of this
information-sharing is predicated upon the U.S. providing probable cause of
criminal activity unrelated to tax evasion.68 The reporting has not reached a
level where it is automatically provided for analysis, but rather reactively when
criminal activity is already suspected.69 Therefore, once the money has
worked its way into the banking systems of these jurisdictions, it will rarely be
detected independently of separate criminal investigation.70 Legislators must
focus on agreements with other countries, particularly those considered offshore banking countries, if they are to have any success in stopping money
laundering after the placement stage.71
With the use of technology, money laundering can be facilitated by
moving money between accounts and through intermediaries in off-shore
accounts simply by using a computer service.72 Due to the overwhelmingly
large number of electronic and wire transactions that occur each day, it would
be impractical to monitor them all, even with international cooperation.73
3.

Integration

The final stage of the money laundering process is the integration of the
funds back into commerce. At this time the money has been divided up,
possibly intermingled with legitimate funds, and moved between a number of
banks, accounts, and nations, making it almost impossible to trace.74 If the

65. Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide Hundreds of Billions in Cayman Accounts, 34
TAX NOTES INT’L 898, 902 (2004).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 903.
68. Id. at 903–04.
69. Id.
70. SAVLA, supra note 24, at 14.
71. Several international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), and
Financial Stability Forum have been targeting offshore bank secrecy for a number of years
through blacklists and sanctions. See Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Anti-Money Laundering
and Counter-Terrorism Financial Enforcement Regimes After September 11, 2001, 22 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 123, 136–37 (2004).
72. JEFFREY ROBINSON, THE LAUNDRYMEN: INSIDE MONEY LAUNDERING, THE WORLD’S
THIRD-LARGEST BUSINESS 30–31 (1996).
73. Id. at 31. As of 1996, “more than five hundred thousand wire transfers, representing in
excess of $1 trillion, electronically circle[d] the globe daily.” Id.
74. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 295.
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money has been laundered successfully, there will be little or no way to
determine the original source. This is desirable to terrorists whether the money
was originally legitimate or not. If the original source of the funds cannot be
determined, then that source can continue to provide funds to other terrorists.
It is at this time that the money can be used with relative impunity to purchase
the goods or services necessary to implement an attack.
B.

Anti-Money Laundering Legislation

Prior to 9-11, little attention was given to anti-money laundering
legislation. Money launderers were rarely prosecuted successfully, for a
variety of reasons.75 Also, there was a trend away from requiring reporting
from financial institutions due to privacy concerns.76 Since 9-11, these
concerns have been overlooked in part because of the increased scrutiny of
terrorism.77 While civil libertarians leveled significant criticism at much of the
legislation in response to the increasingly invasive reporting requirements,
others view the legislation as long overdue.78 Prior to 9-11, the primary tool
for combating money laundering 9-11 was the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
(BSA).79 After 9-11, the Patriot Act largely amended the BSA in an effort to
combat terrorism more effectively by closing loopholes in the BSA and by
addressing the international nature of money laundering.80 The BSA as
amended by the USA Patriot Act provides the primary tools used to combat
money laundering in the United States.
1.

The Bank Secrecy Act

The BSA served as a landmark in the history of money laundering
legislation. It was Congress’s first foray into the arena of money laundering
legislation.81 The BSA referred to Titles I and II of the Bank Records and

75. Lisa A. Barbot, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TUL. J. INT’L. &
COMP. L. 161, 193–98 (1995). These factors may include, among others: (1) the complexity of
money laundering; (2) lax anti-money laundering legislation in various parts of the world; (3) tax
havens; (4) various bank secrecy laws; (5) corporate secrecy; and (6) attorney–client privilege
issues. Id. at 194–98.
76. Denise Couture, Muted Response to U.S. Law, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 31, 2001, at
21; Megan Roberts, Big Brother Isn’t Just Watching You, He’s Also Wasting Your Tax Payer
Dollars: An Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 573, 582 (2004).
77. See Couture, supra note 76, at 21.
78. Id. Much of the criticism revolves around the same issues that were dispensed within
California Bankers Assn. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
79. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114; see Matthew S. Morgan, Money Laundering: The
American Law and Its Global Influence, 3 NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. AM. 24, 26 (1997).
80. See generally Zagaris, supra note 71, at 133–36.
81. Morgan, supra note 79, at 26.
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Foreign Transactions Act that became law in 1970.82 The stated purpose of the
BSA was “to require the maintenance of appropriate types of records by
insured banks in the United States where such records have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.”83 In
effect, the BSA sought to create a paper trail with regard to large transactions
to be used by government agencies to detect and pursue criminal activity.84
The BSA did not criminalize the act of money laundering, but rather sought to
use the records to prosecute the underlying criminal activity inherent in money
laundering. The underlying criminal activities of money laundering range
from simple tax evasion to drug trafficking and terrorism.
The BSA has been continuously amended since its enactment, and has
been described as a “chess game pitting those seeking to launder illicit monies
against those seeking to stop them.”85 This describes the unique qualities of
anti-money laundering legislation. Often those who seek to launder money
have specialized knowledge of the financial industry, or have retained the
services of professionals with such knowledge.86
The BSA does not actually specify the type of reports that financial
institutions must file, but rather serves as an enabling statute that authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations to that end.87 The most
significant contribution to the current anti-money laundering regulatory
scheme is a regulation issued by the Secretary of the Treasury that requires
financial institutions, as defined by the BSA, to file Currency Transaction
Reports (CTRs). The regulation provides that “[w]hen a domestic financial
institution is involved in a transaction for the payment, receipt, or transfer of
United States coins or currency” over the amount of $10,000, the institution
must file a CTR.88
The constitutionality of the BSA was challenged shortly after its
enactment, and in 1974 the issue came before the Supreme Court in California
Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz.89 A group of banks, financial institutions, and their
customers sought to enjoin the enforcement of the regulations promulgated by
the Secretary of Treasury, claiming, inter alia, that the reporting requirements
82. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2000).
83. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 § 101.
84. Zagaris, supra note 71, at 125–26.
85. Morgan, supra note 79, at 27.
86. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 281–82. Part of the reason that money laundering
itself was criminalized in the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 was to curb the
involvement of professionals such as accountants and attorneys in money laundering activities.
Id. While the professionals may not have been involved in the underlying crimes, and indeed
may not have even had knowledge of the underlying crimes, they could still be prosecuted for
money laundering offenses. Id.
87. See Morgan, supra note 79, at 28.
88. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b) (2005).
89. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
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amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.90 The banks were concerned with the costs of implementing the
regulations and claimed that the reporting requirements were sufficiently
demanding as to constitute a violation of due process.91 Justice Rehnquist
dismissed this due process argument decisively, stating that the issue “[did] not
warrant extended treatment.”92 The Court further explained that the BSA was
passed only after extensive congressional findings that provided evidence that
most of the required records were maintained by banks in the regular course of
business.93 Therefore, it would have been difficult to establish a significant
burden on the banks.
The customers, represented by the ACLU, were concerned about the
invasion of privacy that resulted from banks disclosing information about their
currency transactions.94 Justice Douglas expressed sympathy for this point of
view in his dissenting opinion, explaining that “[i]n a sense a person is defined
by the checks he writes.”95 Justice Douglas went on to write that “[b]y
examining them the agents get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political
allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers
and magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum.”96 Further, Justice Douglas
theorized that recording all of our phone conversations would most likely aid
criminal investigations, though clearly in violation of the Fourth Amendment.97
It should be noted in response to Justice Douglas’s criticism, however, that
most of the records the BSA required to be maintained were generally kept
prior to its enactment, distinguishing it from a situation where a person’s phone
calls were recorded, with no apparent independent purpose.98 The Court
recognized that the purpose of the BSA was merely to insure that all banks met
a minimum standard.99 Moreover, the vast majority of customer transactions
would not be reported. Only those that met the reporting requirements, those
in excess of $10,000, would be reported automatically.100 The majority
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 41.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 52–53.
California Bankers Ass’n, 416 U.S. at 43.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976).
Id.
Robert S. Pasley, Privacy Rights v. Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement, 6 N.C.
BANKING INST. 147, 195 (2002).
Further, the BSA does not require the banks to “spy” on their customers, but instead to
simply retain copies of documents that the banks already possess, to which banks are a
party, and that were found to “have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings” and to report “abnormally large transactions in
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dismissed the claims and upheld the BSA and the regulations promulgated by
the Secretary of Treasury, finding that the reporting requirements did not
amount to a taking and that there was not a violation of due process as the state
had a legitimate interest in the information.101 The Court focused specifically
on the damage that money laundering did to the tax system.102 Although the
Court mentioned the facilitation of criminal activity inherent in money
laundering, this was not the primary focus.103 The Court dismissed the claims
based on the filed CTR, holding that customers who did not engage in the type
of $10,000 domestic currency transaction requiring reporting lacked standing
to challenge the domestic reporting regulations.104
Shortly thereafter, the issue again came before the Supreme Court in U.S.
v. Miller.105 This time, the Court addressed the customer’s complaint and held
that customers of banks had no expectation of privacy with regard to
information that they had voluntarily disclosed to a third party.106 The Court
went on to explain that when customers disclosed transactional information to
the bank, they should expect that the bank would convey the information to the
government, regardless of whether the customer expects that the third party
will keep the information privileged and use it for a specified purpose.107 The
Court seemed to take the stance that the bank was not acting as a government
agent even though the documents in question were maintained pursuant to the
BSA. Rather, the Court viewed the records as those that should be kept in the
ordinary course of business, for which the BSA set minimum standards.
The decisions in California Bankers Assn. and Miller were significant
because they provided constitutional validity to the regulatory scheme
established by the BSA. Thirty years after these cases were decided, they are
still relevant because, although the BSA has been amended a number of times,
the basic regulatory scheme remains the same. These two cases set the stage
for an expansive regulatory scheme based on financial institutions reporting
the activity of their customers.
Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the BSA, there
continue to be critics of the reporting requirements. These critics have

currency.” These reportable cash transactions in excess of $10,000 are, in fact, unusual
for most individuals and certainly do not constitute “all bank records of every citizen.”
Nor do these large cash transactions indicate in any way a customer’s “religion, ideology,
opinions, and interests.”
Id. at 197.
101. California Bankers Ass’n., 416 U.S. at 50–52.
102. Id. at 27–28.
103. Id. at 26–30.
104. Id. at 68.
105. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
106. Id. at 443.
107. Id.
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expressed concern over the fact that the financial institutions are essentially
forced to spy on their own customers.108 One commentator analogized the
BSA reporting requirements to “effectively deputizing bank tellers to act as
law-enforcement agents against their own customers.”109 Privacy issues were
raised by legislators prior to the bill’s enactment, and continued to be of
concern, until the 9-11 attacks largely quieted the movement.110
During the period after the BSA was first enacted, many financial
institutions failed to fully comply with the regulations.111 It was not until
February 1985, when the U.S. Treasury fined the Bank of Boston $500,000 for
a failure to report over 1,100 transactions totaling over $1.6 billion that the
banking industry began to take the regulations seriously.112 In part, this led to
the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA).113 However, thirty-four
years after its enactment, although revised a number of times, the BSA
continues to provide one of the most commonly used tools in fighting money
laundering, and financial institutions may face stiff penalties for the failure to
adhere to it.114 The approach to money laundering established by the BSA is
largely still intact, and continues to inform efforts to address the issue.
2.

The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986

In 1986, Congress determined that the BSA as enacted had not been
effective in controlling money laundering.115 As a result, Congress enacted the
MLCA as a part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.116 The MLCA went a
step further than the BSA, and actually criminalized the act of money
laundering.117 The MLCA also protected financial institutions from civil
liability for providing information to the government, referred to as “safe
harbor” provisions.118 It also addressed the inflexible reporting requirements

108. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 304–05.
109. David S. Cloud & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Treasury Seeks to Ease Costliness of
Antilaundering Rules on Banks, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2001, at A4.
110. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 304.
111. See Morgan, supra note 79, at 28–29.
112. Id.
113. Pub. L. No. 99-750, 100 Stat. 3207; see Morgan, supra note 79, at 29.
114. See, e.g., Robert G. Bagnall, Anti-Money Laundering, SJ095 ALI-ABA 222, 236–37
(2004). In July 2001, U.S. Trust Corporation consented to a $10 million civil penalty for failing
to “maintain proper controls and procedures relating to BSA compliance.” Id. at 236. A few
months later, in November 2001, the State Bank of India consented to a $7.5 million penalty for
similar conduct. Id.
115. Morgan, supra note 79, at 29.
116. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; see Morgan, supra note 79, at 29; Zagaris, supra
note 71, at 126.
117. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956, 1957) [hereinafter MLCA].
118. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 293–96.
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created by the BSA.119 Under the BSA, only transactions that exceeded the
amount prescribed by the Secretary of Treasury ($10,000) would be
reported.120 Money launderers became adept at smurfing (breaking up the
transactions to smaller amounts) to avoid drawing attention.121 Courts were
split regarding whether structuring the transactions violated the statute.122 As a
result, the MLCA criminalized the act of structuring transactions in order to
“cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a
[required report].”123 This was largely in response to the confusion by both the
courts and the financial institutions regarding whether structuring violated the
regulations as promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury.124 A number of
banks were already filing CTRs when deposits were structured in a way to
avoid reporting requirements.125
Financial institutions may face stiff penalties for failing to observe the
aggregation reporting requirements. The Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCen), the agency responsible for enforcing the BSA and
subsequent amendments, including the Patriot Act, recently issued an opinion
regarding aggregating transactions in a case involving Western Union.126
119. Jimmy Gurule, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating a New Federal
Offense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative Means of Punishing Specified
Unlawful Activity?, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823, 825 (1995).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with the BSA
stated:
Each financial institution shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of
currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution, which
involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000. Such reports shall be made on
forms prescribed by the Secretary and all information called for in the forms shall be
furnished.
31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) (1980). The courts took a variety of positions regarding whether
“smurfing” or structuring deposits to avoid the filing requirements violated the statute. The First
Circuit held that the regulations as written violated the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
U.S. v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1985). The Seventh Circuit held that the banks had
no duty to report transactions under the $10,000 ceiling, and thus structuring deposits did not
constitute a crime. U.S. v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1987). At the other end of the
spectrum, the Second Circuit appeared to adopt a policy it referred to as structural liability, and
held that structuring transactions so as to avoid reporting requirements was a crime. U.S. v.
Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1986). The issue became moot when the MLCA was
passed, as it specifically criminalized the structuring of transactions. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1354,
100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2002)).
123. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 § 1354.
124. See supra text accompanying note 122.
125. Id.
126. In re Western Union Financial Services, Inc., No. 2003-02, Treas. Dep’t Fin. Crimes
Enforcement Network (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/western_union_
assessment.pdf).
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Western Union consented to a civil penalty of $3 million.127 In the opinion,
FinCen reiterated previous findings that transactions made by the same person,
or on behalf of the same person and known to the financial institution, must be
aggregated with regard to the CTR reporting requirements, even if they are
made among different agents.128
The legislative history of the MLCA does not indicate any significant
interest in terrorism.129 Rather, Congress seemed more concerned with
professionals in legitimate businesses turning a blind eye to clients that were
involved in money laundering schemes.130 This was criminalized in the
MLCA, which makes it illegal to knowingly engage in a transaction for an
amount of more than $10,000 where the money is derived from unlawful
activity.131 The government does not need to prove the defendant had
knowledge that the money was derived from unlawful activity, only that the
defendant knowingly engaged in the transaction.132 The purpose was to
eliminate the defense of willful blindness by professionals with specialized
knowledge of money laundering laws.133 In effect, the Act was used mostly to
prosecute those involved in drug sales.134 Some scholars claimed that the
MLCA did not define a new type of illegal conduct, but rather allowed new
ways to prosecute underlying offenses that may have been more difficult to
prove.135 As a result, the MLCA added little to the detection and prosecution
of those who finance terrorism.136 The MLCA’s primary contribution was the
criminalization of money laundering.137
3.

The Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992

The Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992138 was passed
in response to inflexibility in the existing anti-money laundering scheme.139 It

127. Id. at 5.
128. Id. at 2.
129. See generally Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 291.
130. Gurule, supra note 119, at 825.
131. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352, 100 Stat. 3207
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2000)).
132. See Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 292 (explaining that “[t]he government must
prove: 1) that illicit funds were derived from one of the [specified unlawful activities] in the
statute; and 2) that the defendant engaged in the [specified unlawful activity], then laundered the
illicit proceeds”).
133. Gurule, supra note 119, at 825.
134. See id. at 853–54.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 853 (arguing that Congressional intent was limited to attacking the activities of
“post-crime hiding and reinvesting of illicit profits to continue proscribed criminal activity”).
137. See id.
138. Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
Titles 12, 18, and 31 of the U.S. Code).
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was becoming apparent to legislators that money launderers were becoming
increasingly sophisticated, and quickly adapting to anti-money laundering
legislation.140 CTRs are inflexible, and law enforcement officials felt that a
significant amount of illegal activity was still going unnoticed due to
“smurfing.”141 As a response, the Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering
Act created the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR),142 and in effect shifted to
the banking community the responsibility of determining which transactions
should be reported.143 The Act specifically prohibited notifying the subject of
the SAR that he had been reported.144 The constitutional validity of the SAR
has not been seriously challenged. However, courts have had the opportunity
to consider the prohibition on notification of the subject of the report. The
courts have recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in keeping the
SAR confidential so as not to “compromise an ongoing law enforcement
investigation, provide information to a criminal wishing to evade detection, or
reveal the methods by which banks are able to detect suspicious activity.”145
According to the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury,
financial institutions were required to file a SAR with the proper regulatory
authority for “any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law
or regulation.”146 The regulations also lowered the threshold amount from
$10,000, as required by a CTR, to $5,000.147 The Act provided for strict
liability for the failure to file a report, while at the same time providing
immunity to the financial institutions for filing an unnecessary report in good

139. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against
Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311,
362–63 (2003); see also Patricia Shaughnessy, The New EU Money-Laundering Directive:
Lawyers As Gate-Keepers and Whistle Blowers, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 25, 25 (2002) (“As
developments in technology and in the financial sector allowed for increasingly complex
transnational transactions, money-launderers became more sophisticated, employed new
channels, and became linked not only with drug traffickers, but also with other criminal groups,
including terrorists.”).
140. See Cuellar, supra note 139, at 362–63.
141. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 967.
142. Annunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act of 1992 § 1517; see also Gouvin, supra note 6,
at 967.
143. Morgan, supra note 79, at 41–42.
144. Annunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act of 1992 § 1517(g)(2).
145. Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (S.D. Tex. 2004); see also
Cotton v. PrivateBank & Trust Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 809, 815 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[T]he disclosure
of [a] SAR may harm the privacy interests of innocent people whose names may be contained
therein.”).
146. 31 C.F.R. § 103.20(a)(1) (2005).
147. 31 C.F.R. § 103.20(a)(3).
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faith.148 The result was the “generation of large numbers of extraneous
reports,” reporting mostly innocent activity.149
The Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act also required that each
financial institution implement an Anti-Money Laundering Program.150 The
Secretary of the Treasury was required to implement regulations that would
require at a minimum: “(A) the development of internal policies, procedures,
and controls, (B) the designation of a compliance officer, (C) an ongoing
employee training program, and (D) an independent audit function to test
programs.”151
Both the SAR and the anti-money laundering program provisions are still
intact today, and have been significantly expanded by the Patriot Act.
4.

The Patriot Act

Shortly after the attacks on 9-11, Congress passed the Patriot Act in
response to the new focus on terrorism.152 Significant criticism has been aimed
at the Patriot Act since its enactment regarding the method in which it was

148. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 967–68. The immunity only extends to reports made to law
enforcement agencies. Nevin v. Citibank, N.A., 107 F. Supp. 2d 333, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that a financial institution was not immune from suit when the SAR was provided to
another private party). However, the financial institutions are immune from liability for a variety
of disclosures, including “(i.) A disclosure of any possible law or regulation, (ii.) A disclosure
pursuant to § 5318(g) itself, or (iii.) A disclosure pursuant to any other authority.” Coronado v.
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 222 F.3d 1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (holding that
a grand jury subpoena qualifies as “other authority,” that safe harbor is not limited to CTR, and
that any provision grants the financial institution complete immunity). But see Lopez v. First
Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 129 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that “verbal
instructions” did not qualify as “other authority” under safe harbor provisions).
149. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 967. Although innocent conduct is routinely reported, the
courts have protected the privacy interest of the subject of the SAR. While the information is
provided to the government, the courts have not allowed the documents to be provided to third
parties. See Cotton, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (holding that SAR was not discoverable, but
documents of underlying transaction were); see also Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 682–83.
[Financial institutions] are protected from the production of communications they made to
governmental agencies or officials reporting possible or suspected violations of laws or
regulations by the defendants, or pertaining to such reports. Such communications may
consist of a SAR itself; communications pertaining to a SAR or its contents;
communications preceding the filing of a SAR and preparatory or preliminary to it;
communications that follow the filing of a SAR and are explanations or follow-up
discussions; or oral communications or suspected or possible violations that did not
culminate in the filing of a SAR.
Id.
150. Annunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-550, § 1517(h), 106 Stat.
4044 (1992) (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 5314).
151. Id.
152. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 291.
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passed. The bill saw almost no opposition in either the House or the Senate.153
After the Patriot Act became law, it was discovered that many legislators either
did not attempt to, or did not have time to, study the provisions of the Act
before they had to vote.154 While this is certainly a disturbing commentary on
the state of Congress, careful study might not have had as large of an effect on
the final form of Title III as it would have had on other provisions of the
Patriot Act.155 Much of the legislation included in Title III has been debated in
the public arena for a number of years, even dating back to the 1970s when
money laundering legislation first came into play with the BSA.156 Although
some have criticized the legislation based on the fact that it was defeated a
number of times, this may also indicate that the legislation was not quite as
rushed as it seemed. Rather, one could determine that 9-11 provided the
motivation, or increased state interest, that was necessary to justify the
increased imposition on financial institutions.157 The amendments to the BSA
in the Patriot Act expanded the reach of the BSA and subjected a number of
new financial institutions, including informal money transfer services, to the
reporting requirements previously enacted.158 These institutions were also
required to implement anti-money laundering provisions.159 The Patriot Act
also requires banks and other financial institutions to implement customer
identification programs, commonly referred to as “know your customer”
(KYC) provisions.160 As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the
Patriot Act did not significantly alter the nature of the regulatory scheme, but
rather expanded the existing scheme.
a.

Industries Subjected to BSA Requirements

The industries that are subject to the anti-money laundering provisions
after the enactment of the Patriot Act are “mutual funds; operators of credit
card systems; money services businesses, such as money transfer companies
and check cashers; securities brokers and dealers registered with the Securities
153. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 960–61.
154. Id.
155. But see Gilbert NMO Morris, Issues in Title III Compliance Under the USA Patriot Act,
28 TAX NOTES INT’L 385, 387 (2002).
156. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 963; Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 300–01
(summarizing proposed legislation that was not enacted from 1998–2001).
157. See Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 290–91; see also Michael T. McCarthy, USA
Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 451 (2002) (suggesting that the sweeping legislation in
the Patriot Act might not have been solely a rushed power grab, but rather that “lawmakers may
have reached a measured conclusion that the attacks had indeed changed assumptions about the
nature of the threat to domestic security, and that prior political conceptions about executive
authority were no longer apt”).
158. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 970.
159. Id. at 971.
160. Id. at 970.
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and Exchange Commission; and futures commission merchants and
accompanying introducing brokers registered with the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission.”161 One of the requirements was that they file SARs.
According to 12 C.F.R. § 21.11, banks and other financial institutions must file
a SAR with FinCEN when
the bank knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that: (i) [t]he transaction
involves funds derived from illegal activities or is intended or conducted in
order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activities . . . as
part of a plan to violate or evade any law or regulation or to avoid any
transaction reporting requirement under Federal law; (ii) [t]he transaction is
designed to evade any regulations promulgated under the Bank Secrecy Act; or
(iii) [t]he transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the
sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage,
and the institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after
examining the available facts, including the background and possible purpose
of the transaction.162

The Patriot Act also shored up the “safe harbor” provision, so that financial
institutions are largely immune for filing SARs unnecessarily.163 Congress
entrusted the enforcement of the Patriot Act and previous BSA provisions to
FinCEN.164
SARs are generally completed by those who come into direct contact with
depositors of money. A potential problem of SAR reporting is that there is
little motivation to report this activity. Unlike other crimes where there is an
identifiable victim, the ultimate harm of money laundering is not quite as
apparent.165 Suspicious Activity Reports often require the initiative of
relatively low level operatives within an organization, who may be deterred by
the extensive reporting requirements. The Treasury Department has outlined

161. Morris, supra note 155, at 390.
162. 12 CFR § 21.11(c)(4) (2005).
163. The Patriot Act provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, any consumer reporting agency or agent
or employee thereof making disclosure of consumer reports or other information pursuant
to this section in good-faith reliance upon a certification of a governmental agency
pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not be liable to any person for such
disclosure under this subchapter, the constitution of any State, or any law or regulation of
any State or any political subdivision of any State.
Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 626(e), 115 Stat. 272, 328 (2001) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1681). Section 302(b)(9) of the Patriot Act stated that one of the purposes was “to
clarify the terms of the safe harbor from civil liability for filing suspicious activity reports.” §
302(b)(9).
164. Patriot Act § 361.
165. See Daley, supra note 40, at 179 (“Money laundering is a paperless crime, without
physical violence directed at individuals.”).
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specific circumstances in which a CTR is required.166 Financial institutions
therefore generally have little difficulty determining when a CTR should be
filed. However, the situations in which an SAR is required are less specific.
While many large depositary institutions have created a position for a
compliance officer, and have attempted to instruct the lower-level operatives of
what these situations might be, there is still a high degree of discretion at the
lower levels. Money laundering can most easily be detected by employees
who have a personal exchange with the money launderer.167 In the case of the
largest money transfer company, Western Union, the employees responsible
for completing the SARs might not even be employees of Western Union.168
Many Western Union locations are operated by independent contractors who
provide the money transfer service via Western Union, but are employed by
the facility from which the service is offered.169 The limited relationship
between Western Union and the independent contractor may make it even
more difficult for Western Union to enforce and monitor compliance with the
reporting requirements.170
Significantly, section 359 of the Patriot Act extends financial reporting
requirements to informal value transfer systems (IVTS).171 The Patriot Act
also establishes criminal penalties for unlicensed money transfer services.172
This requirement appears to be aimed at hawalas, which are a type of IVTS

166. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
167. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 281.
168. Heather Timmons, Terrorist Money by Wire, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 94.
169. Id. The investigation into 9-11 has provided evidence that many of the terrorists
involved in the attack transferred or received money through Western Union terminals in places
such as a Mail Boxes, Etc. and Giant Supermarket in Laurel, Maryland. Heather Timmons,
Western Union: Where the Money Is—In Small Bills, BUS. WK., Nov. 26, 2001, at 40. There
were also transfers in and out of Logan Airport and the Boston bus station. Id.
170. Western Union recently settled an action brought by New York’s banking regulators for
$8 million without admitting wrongdoing. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 965. The regulators alleged
that Western Union had violated state and federal currency transaction reports. Id.
171. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 359, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. §§ 5312, 5318, 5330).
172. Id. § 373. The section defines unlicensed money transmitting business as one that
(A) is operated without an appropriate money transmitting license in a State where such
operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony under State law, whether or not
the defendant knew that the operation was required to be licensed or that the
operation was so punishable;
(B) fails to comply with the money transmitting business registration requirements under
section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or regulations prescribed under such
section; or
(C) otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the
defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used . . .
to promote or support unlawful activity.
Id.
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that ties much of the Islamic world together financially.173 The purpose of
these systems is to transfer value between people, often in different countries,
without actually moving the money.174 The potential value to terrorists is that
the process leaves a sparse money trail, if a trail exists at all. The process is
relatively simple. An individual will go to a hawaladar in one country and
request that money be transferred to an individual in another country.175 The
hawaladar will give the individual wishing to transfer money a code, which he
will then communicate to the recipient.176 The hawaladar will contact another
hawaladar in the target country and instruct him to pay an amount of money to
the recipient upon presentation of the code.177 The two hawaladars will then
settle for the balance in some other type of transaction.178 This can include a
more formal transaction, or invoice manipulation.179 These systems have been
in existence for an extended period of time, and the vast majority of IVTS
activity appears to be legitimate in purpose.180 “In countries lacking a stable
financial sector or containing substantial areas not served by formal financial
institutions, IVTS may be the only method for conducting financial
transactions.”181 These types of IVTS can also be used when immigrants are
sending small amounts of money home to their families and formal value
transfer systems are too expensive.182 Reports have been mixed with regard to
the success of regulating these industries. The same factors which make this
type of transfer inexpensive also contribute to its potential for abuse. Although
it is currently impossible to estimate with any accuracy the amount of money
that changes hands through this system, it has been estimated to be in the tens
of billions of dollars annually.183 Even if this industry was not years behind its
173. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 977–78. Hawalas are not the only type of IVTS. ROBINSON,
supra note 72, at 14. These systems have been around for a significant period of time, and are
generally the result of political turmoil or a distrust of banks. Id. Although other types of IVTS
exist in the U.S., considering the timing and purpose of the Patriot Act, it most likely sought to
regulate hawalas, considering the strong ties to Islam, and evidence that the system has been used
for terrorist purposes. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 978–79.
174. See Rachana Pathak, The Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala: A Cultural Norm or a
Terrorist Hotbed?, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2007, 2011–15 (2004).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Pathak, supra note 174, at 2011–15.
180. SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 359 OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING
AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT
TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, at 6 (Nov. 2002) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 359].
181. Id. at 5.
182. See Pathak, supra note 174, at 2016.
183. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 359, supra note 180, at 5.
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formal value transfer systems counterparts in the regulatory scheme, the
transfer of illegal proceeds going to terrorists would still be difficult to
detect.184 The information that is provided by the IVTS reporting must be
added to the vast amount of information already provided by formal value
transfer systems. However, at the very least, those providing the hawala
services will be required to keep adequate records that can be used by law
enforcement officials, provided they comply with the regulations.185 With the
ever increasing regulations on the formal value transfer systems, hawalas
would become a natural alternative to terrorists seeking to move money
without leaving a trail.186 While enforcement of these provisions may be
difficult, it should not be overlooked by law enforcement agencies seeking to
implement a comprehensive anti-money laundering strategy.
b.

Know Your Customer

Section 326 of the Patriot Act required the “Secretary of the Treasury [to]
prescribe regulations setting forth the minimum standards for financial
institutions and their customers regarding the identity of the customer that shall
apply in connection with the opening of an account at a financial
institution.”187 These require banks and other financial institutions to maintain
accurate records concerning the ownership of accounts.188 The Act also
requires financial institutions to compare the names of new owners to lists of
known terrorists.189
For individuals that are residents of the U.S., obtaining proof of identity
may be fairly simple. Generally a driver’s license or passport is sufficient to
establish identity.190 If the customer is not a U.S. resident, identification still
184. See Pathak, supra note 174, at 2057–58.
185. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 979 (proposing that there will not be substantial compliance
within the hawala community due to a history of secrecy, and difficulty of identifying hawalas).
186. Intuitively, it would seem a natural alternative if terrorist access to the conventional
banking systems were curtailed. However, there is evidence that the 9-11 hijackers “did not
extensively rely on hawala networks.” Pathak, supra note 174, at 2057.
187. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326(a), 115 Stat. 272, 317 (2001) (codified as
amended in 31 U.S.C. § 5318). The minimum requirements must include reasonable procedures
for
(A) verifying the identity of any person seeking to open an account to the extent
reasonable and practicable; (B) maintaining records of the information used to verify a
person’s identity, including name, address, and other identifying information; and (C)
consulting lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to the
financial institution by any government agency to determine whether a person seeking to
open an account appears on any such list.
Id.
188. Id.
189. Michael F. McEneney, David E. Teitelbaum & Karl F. Kaufmann, Customer
Identification Requirements Under the USA Patriot Act, 59 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1295 (2004).
190. Id. at 1292.
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needs to be confirmed.191 However, regulators have not been clear on exactly
what types of foreign-issued identification will be sufficient.192 “Know your
customer” (KYC) provisions were not invented by the Patriot Act. They were
first proposed in 1998, but banks and other depositary institutions fought
strongly against them and won.193 The banks expressed concern over the everincreasing quantity of information that they were being required to present to
the government, and over the eroding privacy of their customers.194 However,
concern for terrorism after 9-11 again won out when similar provisions were
enacted by the Patriot Act.195
c.

Anti-Money Laundering Program Provisions

Section 352 of the Patriot Act requires financial institutions included in the
Act to establish programs to counter money laundering schemes.196 This
section of the Act requires “(A) the development of internal policies,
procedures and controls; (B) the designation of a compliance officer; (C) an
ongoing employee training program; and (D) an independent audit function to
test programs.”197 Many banks and other financial institutions already had
these programs in place, as they were established in the Annunzio–Wylie AntiMoney Laundering Act of 1992. The Patriot Act did not substantially alter the
structure or requirements of these programs.
d.

Information Sharing

Section 314 of the Patriot Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to
adopt regulations that will encourage cooperation between financial
institutions, regulatory authorities, and law enforcement agencies.198 This
section also required banks to appoint a person to receive information

191. Id. at 1290.
192. Id. at 1290–91. Information sufficient to identify non-U.S. persons include a passport
number, a taxpayer identification number, or an alien identification card number. 31 C.F.R. §
103.121 (b)(2)(i)(A)(4)(ii) (2003). However, the less specific portion allows the “number and
country of issuance of any other government-issued document evidencing nationality or residence
and bearing a photograph or similar safeguard.” Id.
193. Daniel Mulligan, Comment, Know Your Customer Regulations and the International
Banking System: Towards a General Self-Regulatory Regime, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2324,
2363–65 (1999). The KYC provisions in the Patriot Act are not quite as extensive as those
originally proposed, as they are not designed to address ongoing review or monitoring of
accounts. Pasley, supra note 100, at 209.
194. See McEneney et al., supra note 189, at 1295.
195. Zagaris, supra note 71, at 127–28.
196. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 352, 115 Stat. 272, 322 (2001) (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (Supp. I 2003)).
197. Id.
198. Id. § 314(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 307.
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regarding the subjects of the investigations and to monitor their accounts.199
The section also provided for information-sharing between banks, and it
relieved them of any liability for sharing the information or for failing to notify
the subject of the information in the communication.200 The Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network has been charged with coordinating the requests
between law enforcement agencies and the financial institutions.201 The
regulations issued by the Secretary do not give FinCEN the power to arbitrarily
request information from financial institutions. When a request is made to a
financial institution, FinCEN must certify, at a minimum, that the individual
about which the law enforcement agency seeks information “is reasonably
suspected based on credible evidence of engaging in[] terrorist activity or
FinCEN must also provide “enough specific
money laundering.”202
identifiers . . . that would permit a financial institution to differentiate between
common or similar names.”203 It should be emphasized that while many parts
of the Patriot Act may be over-inclusive, this section provides access to
financial records in cases where terrorism is suspected.
There is some concern that this provision invades the privacy interests of
the customers of the financial institutions.204 However, given the Supreme
Court’s long established stance that the customer has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank vis-à-vis the
government, it would be difficult to challenge the requirements.205
5.

International Action

The attacks on 9-11 also gave rise to increased international scrutiny of
money laundering, specifically with respect to the financing of terrorist
organizations. While the U.S. has always been a leader in the global
community with respect to anti-money laundering legislation,206 prior to 9-11,
there were fundamental differences between the interests of the liberally
governed European Union, and the more conservatively governed U.S.207 The
EU, and specifically the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) had already been pursuing bank secrecy and tax havens

199. Id. § 314(a)(3)(A), 115 Stat. at 307.
200. Id. § 314(b), 115 Stat. at 308.
201. 31 C.F.R. § 103.100(b) (2005).
202. Id. § 103.100(b)(1).
203. Id.
204. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 983.
205. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
206. This is partly because “the U.S. dollar has become the preferred currency of the [drug]
industry and is inextricably intertwined with money laundering activities.” Morgan, supra note
79, at 24.
207. See Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 331–32.
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around the world.208 However, their intent wasn’t so much to curb terrorism or
other underlying crimes as it was to increase tax revenue.209 This conflicted
with conservative groups in the U.S. interested in promoting international tax
competition and attracting foreign investment,210 not to mention with the
interests of the Caribbean nations themselves. In May of 2001, then-Treasury
Secretary Paul O’Neill issued a press release indicating that the U.S. would no
longer support the OECD working-group targeting “harmful tax practices.”211
Although O’Neill stressed the need for information exchange, he indicated that
the U.S. would not support it at the cost of eliminating international tax
competition.212 However, after 9-11 there was an interest in promoting
international financial transparency that trumped the desire to promote tax
competition.213 The U.S. has entered into a number of Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties (MLAT) with foreign nations that provide for the exchange
of information relating to criminal matters.214 In the case of offshore tax
havens such as the Cayman Islands, the treaties require that the offense be a
crime in both jurisdictions, and hence do not allow the exchange of
information for purely tax purposes.215 This agreement allows the U.S. to
request specified information regarding Cayman bank accounts from the
Cayman authorities.216 However, the information may be cumbersome to
obtain.217 New York County District Attorney Robert Morgenthau indicated
his hope that the Patriot Act will allow quicker retrieval of foreign records.218

208. See id. at 330.
209. John Burton & Andrew Parker, Is the Global Crackdown on Tax Evasion ‘Slowing to the
Speed of the Last Ship in the Convoy’?, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at 17.
210. See Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 331. The financial services industry accounts for
30 percent of the Cayman Islands’ gross domestic product, and many predict that imposing strict
money laundering regulations on the system might result in flight of capital from both the EU and
the U.S. Burton & Parker, supra note 209, at 17.
211. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary O’Neill Statement on
OECD Tax Havens (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
po366.htm.
212. Id. Increased international financial reporting has largely been equated with the
elimination of international tax competition, because the reporting requirements would allow
governments to tax their citizens on foreign investment, thus eliminating the benefit of investing
in tax havens.
213. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 332.
214. Richard A. Westin, Expatriation and Return: An Examination of Tax-Driven
Expatriation by United States Citizens, and Reform Proposals, 20 VA. TAX REV. 75, 127–28
(2000).
215. Id. at 127.
216. Id.
217. Bridging the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 300
(2004) (statement of Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York County).
218. See id. (indicating that the Patriot Act’s requirement for “foreign banks with
correspondent accounts in the U.S. to appoint an agent for service of process in this country, will
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The system in place between the Cayman Islands and the U.S. can be seen
as the opposite of the U.S.’s domestic reporting system. In the U.S., every
large or otherwise suspicious activity is reported, resulting in millions of
reports, many of which are completely legitimate. In the case of the Cayman
Islands, the U.S. will not receive any information unless there is an objective
reason that can be presented to the Cayman authorities.
The leading international body with respect to anti-money laundering laws
is the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF).219 The
FATF was formed in 1989 at the G-7 Summit in order to address issues of
international money laundering activity.220 The FATF created a list of forty
recommendations for countries wishing to prevent international money
laundering.221 These forty recommendations have been updated since 1990,
when they were first established.222 In October of 2001, the mission of the
FATF was extended to include all types of international activities used to
finance terrorism.223 The FATF then created eight new recommendations
specifically aimed at curbing terrorist financing.224 These recommendations
largely mirror legislation already enacted in the U.S. and discussed in Part II.B.
of this Comment.225 Two of the recommendations are specifically aimed at
international cooperation.226 The first recommends that all countries “ratify
and . . . implement fully the 1999 United Nations International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.”227 The fifth recommends that
countries establish by treaty information-sharing agreements with other
countries.228

help to circumvent some of the current complexities and obstacles in the MLAT process, as it
applies to foreign banks”).
219. The FATF is made up of twenty-six member nations, all of whom have enacted some
form of anti-money laundering legislation. Daley, supra note 40, at 187. The FATF
“[r]ecommendations [were] the first to stress, in an international forum, the need for financial
institutions to use their expertise to detect suspicious transactions and to notify the appropriate
authorities.” Id.
220. Barbot, supra note 75, at 173–74.
221. Sean D. Murphy, Multilateral Listing of States as Money-Laundering Havens, 94 AM. J.
INT’L L. 695, 696 (2000).
222. Id. at 696 n.5.
223. Andrew Ayers, The Financial Action Task Force: The War on Terrorism Will Not be
Fought on the Battlefield, N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 449, 451 (2002).
224. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/55/16/
34266142.pdf.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at ¶ I.
228. Id. at ¶ V.
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The UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism was adopted on December 9, 1999.229 The UN first addressed the
issue of international money laundering in 1988 with the Vienna Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.230 The
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
prohibits direct involvement or complicity in the international and unlawful
provision or collection of funds, attempted or actual, with the intent or
knowledge that any part of the funds may be used to carry out any of the
offenses described in the Convention, such as those acts intended to cause
death or serious bodily injury to any person not actively involved in armed
conflict in order to intimidate a population, and any act intended to compel a
government or an international organization to take action or abstain from
taking action.231

In addition to prohibiting the act of money laundering, the Convention also
requires signatories to take domestic action “for the detection, freezing,
seizure, and forfeiture of any funds used or allocated for the purposes of
These requirements involve KYC
committing the listed offenses.”232
regulations and suspicious transaction reporting similar to those already in use
in the U.S.233 On September 12, 2001, in the wake of the attacks of 9-11, the
UN Security Counsel adopted Resolution 1368 condemning the terrorist
attacks and calling on member nations to adopt previous conventions regarding
terrorism.234
III. THE BENEFITS OF CURRENT ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION
The BSA as amended by the Patriot Act provides valuable tools to law
enforcement agencies not only in preventing the financing of terrorism, but
also in other areas of the law. The tools included in the Patriot Act
complement existing legislation and give law enforcement agencies the ability
to more effectively trace the proceeds of money that is provided to terrorists
both at home and abroad. Although it has been argued that the increased
regulations on U.S. financial institutions will leave them at a competitive
disadvantage with other less regulated countries, the financial institutions may

229. Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 537, 539
n.6 (2004).
230. Zagaris, supra note 71, at 137.
231. Id. at 138.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 139–40.
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actually see some long-term benefit.235 Further, the Patriot Act does not create
any significant new privacy issues.
A.

Benefits to Law Enforcement

The amendments to the BSA in the Patriot Act have already proven
beneficial to law enforcement officials. FinCEN has established a direct case
support program that functions as a clearing house for information collected
pursuant to the Patriot Act.236 FinCEN was established with the purpose of
assisting all federal agencies with obtaining information relating to terrorist
financing and money laundering.237 Section 314(a) allows law enforcement
agencies to request information regarding suspects, businesses, and
accounts.238 The requested information is then either provided using the
information that FinCEN has already collected, or passed on to more than
20,000 financial institutions in an attempt to obtain the information.239
FinCEN then coordinates the retrieval of the information from the financial
institutions and directs the law enforcement agency to the source of the
information.240 According to FinCEN, its direct case support program
“provides an average of 5,000 analytical case reports each year involving over
25,000 individual subjects annually to federal, state, local, and international
agencies.”241 During the period from February 2003 to June 2004, FinCEN
reports that the inquiries resulted in 1,236 new accounts located, 73 new
transactions identified, 601 grand jury subpoenas served, eleven search
warrants executed, nine individuals indicted, and two individuals arrested.242
The fact that this may seem like a small number of individuals indicted and
arrested considering the scope of the regulatory scheme should not necessarily
be considered a failure. The success of the program would not necessarily

235. See, e.g., George A. Lyden, The International Money Laundering Abatement and AntiTerrorist Financing Act of 2001: Congress Wears a Blindfold While Giving Money Laundering
Legislation a Facelift, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 201, 229–37 (2003).
236. Financial Crimes Enforcement Net, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Law Enforcement /
Direct Case Support, http://www.fincen.gov/le_directcasesupp.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2006);
see also Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 314(a), 115 Stat. 272, 307 (2001).
237. Financial Crimes Enforcement Net, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Law Enforcement /
Direct Case Support, http://www.fincen.gov/le_directcasesupp.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
238. Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Investigations: Who Investigates and How
Effective Are They?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 92 (2004) (statement of
Robert W. Werner, Chief of Staff, FinCEN, Dep’t of the Treasury).
239. Financial Crimes Enforcement Net, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Law Enforcement /
Direct Case Support, http://www.fincen.gov/le_directcasesupp.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. BANK SECRECY ACT ADVISORY GROUP, 7 SAR ACTIVITY REV. 29–30 (2004), available
at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480025.pdf.
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hinge on the number of indictments, but rather the ability to provide valuable
information to other law enforcement agencies.
The direct case support program operated by FinCEN provides information
to programs such as the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) of the
FBI’s Counterterrorism Divison.243 This section was formed in response the
perceived shortcomings in the FBI’s ability to analyze terrorist financing
efforts shortly after 9-11.244 Using the information collected pursuant to the
Patriot Act, TFOS utilizes the data for a variety of purposes including: (1)
“conducting full financial analysis of terrorist suspects and their financial
support structures in the US and abroad”; (2) “developing predictive models
and conducting data analysis to facilitate the identification of previously
unknown or ‘sleeper’ terrorist suspects”; and (3) “providing the financial
component to classified counterterrorism investigations in support of the FBI’s
counterterrorism responsibilities.”245
While some have criticized the ability of the Patriot Act to ferret out
individual acts of terrorism, the purpose of the Act is to complement other
areas of law enforcement, rather than to replace them. The 9-11 Commission
emphasized this in its report, finding that “[c]ounterterrorism investigations
often overlap or are cued by other criminal investigations, such as money
laundering.”246 The Act is being used in conjunction with traditional
intelligence and law enforcement methods to attack the “financial substructure
of terrorist groups.”247 Juan Carlos Zarate, the assistant secretary of the
Treasury for terrorist financing, has emphasized that “[f]inancial records and
audits provide blueprints to the architecture of terrorist organizations.”248 This
information helps law enforcement agencies determine the sources of terrorist
funding, and diminishes the terrorists’ ability to recruit members, carry out
attacks, and purchase dangerous weapons.249
B.

The Competitive Position of U.S. Financial Institutions

Financial institutions have been subject to reporting requirements for over
thirty years and yet have maintained their competitive position in the world
market. When the legislation was first introduced, a senior counsel for the

243. The 9-11 Commission, supra note 7, at 5 (statement of John E. Lewis).
244. Id. at 3.
245. Id. at 4; see also K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the
Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2004) (suggesting that the public
should be active, rather than resistive, in developing computer models that determine suspicious
patterns, and that this would in the long run lead to more liberty, rather than less).
246. THE 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 424.
247. Juan Carlos Zarate, Bankrupting Terrorists, EJOURNAL USA: ECON. PERSPECTIVES,
Sept. 2004, at 3, 4, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0904/ijee/ijee0904.pdf.
248. Id. at 3.
249. Id.
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American Bankers Associations stated that “[t]he practical effect will be fairly
minimal,” and the legislation “simply puts into statute what happens daily in a
financial institution.”250 The additional reporting requirements of the Patriot
Act are unlikely to substantially alter their competitive position. Moreover, the
reporting process is consistently becoming more efficient. FinCen has recently
put into operation the Patriot Act Communication System (PACS), which will
allow many financial institutions to send CTRs and SARs electronically, and in
batches.251 Electronic submission of required reports will not only reduce
costs to the financial institutions in the form of time and materials, but will
allow the reports to be processed more efficiently.252 However, the number of
reports that are filed needs to be, and can be under the current regulatory
scheme, reduced significantly if the reports are to be used efficiently.253
Congress has called for regulations that would decrease the number of reports
filed each year multiple times.254 Reducing the number of reports would have
a number of effects. One would be to reduce the burden on banks by allowing
them to more selectively determine which transactions to report. Another
would be the increased ability of federal agencies to more thoroughly analyze
the remaining reports.255 The budget of FinCEN is currently insufficient to
provide adequate resources to analyze the number of reports currently being
submitted.256 This does not encourage timely and consistent filing by financial
250. Couture, supra note 76, at 21.
251. Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
FinCEN Expands E-Filing System: Financial Institutions Begin Filing BSA Reports over Secure
Internet (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://www.fincen.gov/newsreleasepacs10012002.pdf. The
Director of FinCEN has indicated that he would like to reduce the number of SARs being filed,
focusing more on quality than on quantity. William J. Fox, Director, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at the American Bankers Assn. /
American Bar Assn. Money Laundering Enforcement Seminar (Oct. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/fox102504.pdf. [hereinafter Remarks of William J. Fox].
252. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 969.
253. See Oversight of the Department of the Treasury: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 74 (2004)
(statement of Nancy Jardini, Chief, Criminal Investigation, Internal Revenue Service) (reporting
that nearly 14 million currency forms were filed in 2003).
254. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 968 (explaining that Congress attempted to reduce the
number of CTRs being filed through the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994); see also
Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 366, 115 Stat. 272, 298 (2001) (calling for more efficient use
of the CTR reporting system).
255. The Director of FinCEN has indicated that he would like to reduce the number of SARs
being filed, focusing more on quality than on quantity. Remarks of William J. Fox, supra note
251; see also Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 366(a)(2)–(3), 115 Stat. 272, 335 (2001) (finding
that a large number of CTRs that could otherwise be exempted from the process are being filed,
and that the over-reporting is interfering with effective law enforcement); H.R. REP. NO. 101-446,
at 24 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of the reporting system, but calling on banks to
properly exempt certain transactions in order to alleviate the over reporting of CTRs).
256. Roberts, supra note 76, at 596–97.
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institutions. FinCEN has also expressed concern over the practice of
“defensive” reporting with regard to SARs.257 Due to the increased scrutiny of
anti-money laundering compliance after the enactment of the Patriot Act, many
financial institutions have been over-reporting suspicious activity for fear of
Another factor that contributes to over-reporting
being penalized.258
suspicious activity may be the “safe harbor” provisions that protect banks from
liability for unjustifiably filing an SAR.259
Both the FBI and FinCEN have been implementing data analysis of current
and past reports that will allow them to develop more clear guidelines for use
in determining when certain reports should be filed.260 FinCEN’s efforts to
automate the reporting system should allow them to analyze the data faster,
and provide important feedback to the institutions.261 Furthermore, section
314(d)(1) of the Patriot Act specifically requires the Secretary of the Treasury
to “publish a report containing a detailed analysis identifying patterns of
suspicious activity and other investigative insights derived from suspicious
activity reports and investigations conducted by Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies to the extent appropriate,” and to provide this
information to financial institutions.262
The financial institutions regulated by anti-money laundering legislation
are in a unique position to administer the programs, as much of the information
that is required, particularly by the “know your customer” (KYC) provisions,
would be obtained through the regular practices of the bank.263 As far back as
1997, banks have been encouraged to develop KYC programs on their own
initiative, as the information is often needed to properly file reports required by
other provisions of the BSA such as SARs and CTRs.264 Further, many of
these financial institutions are controlled by shareholders, or at the least by an
owner interested in profits. Therefore, the owners or shareholders have a

257. Remarks of William J. Fox, supra note 251.
258. Id. Financial institutions may also over-report out of fear that sanctions may injure their
reputation. Id.
259. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 351, 115 Stat. 272, 320–21 (2001) (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) (Supp. I 2003)).
260. Oversight of the Department of the Treasury: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 53 (2004)
(written testimony of Samuel W. Bodman, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury). A
small number of SARs are currently being filed electronically. Id. While electronic filling
sometimes burdens institutions that do not file reports frequently, on the whole it has been found
to be faster and more accurate than manual filing. Id.
261. Id.
262. Patriot Act, § 314(d)(1), 115 Stat. at 308.
263. See McEneney, et al., supra note 189, at 1290 (describing the findings of the regulating
agencies that banks will generally obtain information regarding identification through regular
business practices, or in order to comply with other provisions of the BSA).
264. Morgan, supra note 79, at 47.
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vested interest in ensuring that the programs are administered in the most
efficient manner possible.
The Patriot Act has a substantial effect on foreign financial institutions that
wish to do business in the U.S.265 This effect will require many financial
institutions, most of which cannot afford to surrender their access to the largest
financial market in the world, to maintain policies with regard to record
keeping similar to U.S. financial institutions.266 This will therefore lessen any
competitive disadvantage that would arise from the U.S. regulatory scheme.
Also, many of the provisions enacted in the Patriot Act are being advocated by
the U.S. and international organizations in other areas of the world, including
other major banking systems.267 Due to the increasing ease of transferring
money between different financial institutions in the different countries, it is
clear that money laundering cannot be addressed by concentrating on only
domestic enforcement. International organizations such as the FATF have
been attempting to implement more stringent reporting requirements across the
globe.268 In fact, many components of the Patriot Act mirror the anti-money
laundering provisions that are included in the FATF’s Nine Special
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (“Nine Special Recommendations”),
and the U.N. Security Counsel’s Regulation 1373.269 For instance, one of the
Nine Special Recommendations is that “[i]f financial institutions[,] or other
businesses or entities subject to anti-money laundering obligations, suspect or
have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are linked or related to, or are to
be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organisations, they should be
required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities.”270
This was implemented in the U.S. through the use of SARs and by requiring
other financial institutions besides banks to implement reporting procedures.
Another of the Nine Special Recommendations that was codified in U.S. law is

265. See generally Morris, supra note 155 (describing the effects of the Patriot Act).
266. Id. at 387.
267. Zarate, supra note 247, at 5; Karlin Lillington, Tech Advances Make It Harder to Clean
Dirty Money, IR. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004 (explaining that Ireland and the UK are taking similar
efforts to eradicate money laundering).
268. See Matthew R. Hall, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money
Laundering, and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L.J. 643, 675 (1996) (discussing
reporting requirements in foreign countries including the UK, Australia, and Hong Kong); see
also Ricardo A. Pellerano & Eduardo Jorge, Money Laundering Rules in the Domincan Republic,
114 BANKING L.J. 136, 136 (1997) (discussing how authorities in the Dominican Republic have
relied on financial institutions in a manner similar to the United States); Anti-Money Laundering
Laws to Be Tightened, SWISSINFO, Jan. 12, 2005, available at http://www.swissinfo.org/
sen/Swissinfo.html?siteSect=105&sid=5462518 (discussing an announcement by the Swiss
Finance Ministry to attempt to comply with all Recommendations of FATF).
269. Zarate, supra note 247, at 4.
270. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Nine Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing IV (Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/SRecsTF_en.htm.
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Special Recommendation VI, which recommends the licensing and registration
of informal value transfer systems.271 Most of the other Nine Special
Recommendations can also be found codified in U.S. law.272 As off-shore
banking centers come under increased scrutiny for enabling criminals and
terrorists alike, it is likely that the major financial powers in the world will
demand more transparency.273 The U.S. could benefit from establishing a
comprehensive anti-money laundering program now, before they are forced to
in order to participate in the global financial system.
C. Privacy Concerns
Although there are privacy concerns, there is little evidence that in the
thirty years since the BSA has been enacted it has been significantly abused.
Many commentators arguing that the reporting requirements violate the
privacy of customers have referred to the violations in the abstract, rather than
providing specific examples of abuses. Critics of the requirements rarely can
point to specific instances of privacy violations. It can also be argued that the
minimal invasion of privacy incurred when simple financial information is
disclosed to the government is justified by the dangers that money laundering
and terrorism pose to the global financial structure.274 Although there is a risk
of bogging down the financial industry with over-regulation, there is a greater
risk involved with allowing the financial industry to be corrupted by criminal
activity.
The KYC provisions of the Patriot Act have been particularly heavily
criticized. However, as mentioned before, the KYC provisions merely codify a
practice that generally is needed by banks to comply with SAR and CTR
reporting.275 The KYC provisions may even lead to an increase in privacy. If
a bank is satisfied that it has correctly ascertained the identity of a customer,
and has some information regarding the transactional history, then transactions
that may have seemed suspicious if isolated will no longer be considered
suspicious.276 Congress has provided for certain situations where transactions
that would otherwise be subject to reporting requirements are exempt because

271. Id. at VI.
272. A self assessment of U.S. compliance with the Recommendations is available online at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/standards/code9-terror_financing.pdf.
273. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302(a)(4), 115 Stat. 272, 296 (2001) (finding that
“‘offshore’ banking and related facilities designed to provide anonymity, coupled with weak
financial supervisory and enforcement regimes, provide essential tools to disguise ownership and
movement of criminal funds”).
274. Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The
Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 310 (1989).
275. See supra Part II.B.4.
276. Peter E. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money from Reaching the Wash Cycle: A Guide to the
Bank Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING L.J. 230, 239 (1991).
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of the minimal risk they pose.277 Therefore, it seems that what is actually
under attack are the reporting requirements themselves, which have been in
effect for a considerable length of time. The validity of these reporting
requirements has been upheld since the Court decided in favor of the process in
California Bankers Ass’n.278 Further, in U.S. v. Miller,279 the Supreme Court
held that bank customers did not have the right to challenge subpoenas issued
by the government to obtain bank records.280 Therefore, even if government
investigators were required to obtain subpoenas for every request of
information, the banks, rather than the customers, would be responsible for
challenging the subpoenas.
Further, the KYC provision that requires financial institutions to compare
the names of customers to lists of suspected terrorists may be one of the most
effective means of detecting terrorist financing.281 According to FinCEN,
since the implementation of the policy, “the system has been used to send the
names of 1,547 persons suspected of terrorism financing or money laundering
to more than 26,000 financial institutions and has produced 10,560 matches
that were passed on to law enforcement.”282
IV. CONCLUSION
While some critics have claimed that the anti-money laundering laws as
written will not protect the U.S. from terrorism in the future, they may be
viewing the issue too myopically. Although many of the changes may not be
able to ferret out individual acts of terrorism, they will substantially limit
access to U.S. financial systems to terrorists, and make it more difficult to
move money. It will also identify the sources of terrorist funding, allowing
law enforcement to attack terrorism at its base. Implementing such a
comprehensive money laundering strategy will no doubt take time to work out
the problems.283

277. Id. at 235–36; see also Pasley, supra note 100, at 200 (“To the extent the conduct reflects
the normal, appropriate activity of a business, an extensive process exists within the BSA for
exempting such businesses.”).
278. California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
279. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
280. Id. at 444 (explaining that subpoena did not violate Fourth Amendment because
customer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in records that were turned over to a third
party, and subsequently provided to the government). If the customer has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the records that he makes available to his bank, then it is unlikely that a
court would find that the SAR violates the Fourth Amendment, even in the absence of a
subpoena.
281. Zarate, supra note 247, at 4.
282. John J. Byrne, Banks and the USA PATRIOT Act, EJOURNAL USA: ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Sept. 2004, at 18, 21, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0904/ijee/ijee0904.pdf.
283. Zagaris, supra note 71, at 156.
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Title III of the Patriot Act is not a perfect instrument for combating the
financing of terrorism. However, given the scale of international money
laundering, and the extent of global terrorist networks, it would be difficult to
establish any piece of legislation that could put a significant dent in present
levels of criminal activity. The American people are right to be concerned
about privacy and their civil liberties. With this in mind, it should be observed
that at least with respect to Title III of the Patriot Act, the general balance
between privacy and security has remained largely unchanged. While the
Patriot Act has expanded the number of institutions that are subject to
reporting requirements, and codified minimum due diligence procedures, it has
not significantly invaded our private lives beyond what has been law for over
thirty years. The Patriot Act addresses important loopholes in the anti-money
laundering scheme that have been exploited to the detriment of the financial
system. It also provides a much needed focus on the international nature of
money laundering. The balance between privacy and security is an important
discussion, but the issue should be the overall anti-money laundering scheme,
rather than simply the Patriot Act. The Patriot Act provides valuable tools to
law enforcement, without significantly intruding on civil liberties, and should
therefore be extended by Congress past the scheduled sunset date.
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